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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jeremy Gleese appeals, asserting that the district court erred in executing his
sentences rather than placing him on probation or retaining jurisdiction in the four
consolidated cases now on appeal - three probation revocations and one new sentence
imposed. As part of his appeal, he requested the production of various transcripts, but
the Idaho Supreme Court denied his motion to augment the appellate record with those
transcripts.

Mr. Gleese contends this constitutes a violation of his state and federal

constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. As a result, this Court should
grant Mr. Gleese access to the requested transcripts and allow him the opportunity to
file supplemental briefing raising any issues arising from review of those transcripts. In
the event that request is denied, this Court should, nevertheless, vacate the district
court's orders executing his sentences as that decision was an abuse of the district
court's discretion.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In 2004, Mr. Gleese was charged with burglary when he and some friends stole
several packages of chips and bottles of Mountain Dew and lemonade (hereinafter, the
2004 case).

(R., pp.32-33.) As part of his plea agreement in that case, Mr. Gleese

waived his right to appeal the conviction and sentence. (R., p.76.) As this was his first
adult offense and he appeared amenable to treatment (see Presentence Investigation
Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.2-3, 5), 1 the district court granted Mr. Gleese's request for
a withheld judgment and placed him on probation for two years. (R., p.86.)

1

PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic PDF file
"JEREMY MICHAEL GLEESE 40402-SEALED." Included in this file is the PSI report as

1

In 2005, Mr. Gleese was subsequently charged with burglary, aggravated
assault,

malicious

injury to

property,

and

two counts

imprisonment (hereinafter, the first 2005 case).

of misdemeanor false

(R., pp.109-11.)

That case was

consolidated with the 2004 case, in which a report of probation violation had been filed
for the new charges, as well as Mr. Gleese's admission to smoking methamphetamine.
(R., p.116, 119-20.) While that matter was pending, another set of charges for burglary
and grand theft was filed against Mr. Gleese (hereinafter, the second 2005 case).
(R., pp.149-50). Mr. Gleese entered a global plea agreement, whereby he would plead
guilty to two counts of burglary (one from each of the 2005 cases), aggravated assault,
and malicious injury to property, and the State agreed to dismiss the false
imprisonment, resisting, under the influence in public, and grand theft charges. 2
(R., p.177.)
The district court imposed concurrent sentences in the three cases. (R., pp.198,
203, 208.)

In the 2004 case, the district court revoked the withheld judgment and

imposed a unified sentence of three and one-half years, with one year fixed.
(R., p.208.) In the first 2005 case, the district court imposed the following sentences:
for battery, a unified term of eight years, with two and one-half years fixed; for
aggravated assault, a unified term of five years, with two years fixed; and for malicious
injury to property, a unified term of five years, with two years fixed. (R., p.198.) In the
second 2005 case, the district court imposed a unified term of five years, with two years
fixed. (R., p.203.) As a result, Mr. Gleese was sentence to an aggregate term of eight

well as all the documents attached thereto (police reports, addendum from rider staff,
etc.).
2 The State agreed to recommend concurrent sentences between all three cases, and
Mr. Gleese agreed to pay restitution and waive his right to appeal the convictions.
(R., p. 177.)

2

years, with two and one-half years fixed. The district court retained jurisdiction in all the
cases. (R., pp.199, 203, 208.)
However, the rider staff determined Mr. Gleese did not meet the criteria for most
of the programs available on his rider, although it noted he was placed in the
appropriate program. (PSI, p.43.) Nevertheless, Mr. Gleese actively pursued his GED
during that period of retained jurisdiction, although his struggles with literacy kept him
from completing the GED at that time. 3 (PSI, p.46.) However, given adequate time, he
was expected to be able to earn that certificate. He was not a disciplinary problem.
(PSI, p.46.)

Ultimately, the rider staff, noting Mr. Gleese's significant improvement,

recommended he be placed on probation. (PSI, pp.44, 47.) Consequently, the district
court suspended Mr. Gleese's sentences for a five-year period of probation.
(R., pp.227, 234, 241.)

Six months later, a report of probation violation was filed in relation to new
charges arising in Spokane, Washington. 4

(R., pp.247-50.)

The minutes from the

subsequent revocation hearing indicate that both the prosecutor and defense attorney
recommended Mr. Gleese participate in a second rider program. (R., pp.338-39.) The
district court also indicated that Mr. Gleese had "had no treatment at this time."
(R., p.339.) As a result, the district court retained jurisdiction again. (R., pp.343, 346,

349.)
During that second period of retained jurisdiction, Mr. Gleese was assigned to
normal programming. (See PSI, p.87; compare PSI, p.43.) The rider staff noted that,

Mr. Gleese has documented learning issues which required participation in special
education classes, and even caused him to repeat the second grade. (PSI, p.4.)
4 Mr. Gleese served his related sentence in Washington before being returned to Idaho
for resolution of the probation revocation proceedings. (See, e.g., R., p.338.)
3

3

while Mr. Gleese displayed some immature behavior, he was not a disciplinary problem.
(PSI, p.88.) Rather, they concluded that his behavior promised success on probation.
(PSI, p.88.)

For example, when he fell behind in the New Directions program,

Mr. Gleese was able to bring himself current in the program by seeking assistance from
the other program participants. (PSI, p.89.) The district court recognized Mr. Gleese's
good efforts in the rider program and returned him to probation for two years.
(R., pp.355, 358, 362.)
In 2011, the State filed new burglary and petit theft charges against Mr. Gleese

(hereinafter, the 2011 case). (R., p.394.) That case was consolidated with the other
three cases.

(R., p.385.) Mr. Gleese entered a plea agreement, whereby he would

plead guilty to the burglary charge and the state would not file a habitual offender
enhancement.

(R., p.388.)

(Tr., p.5, L.27 - p.6, L.1.)

In addition, the petit theft charge would be dismissed.
The State also agreed to recommend local jail time and

probation, while Mr. Gleese agreed to waive his right to appeal the conviction.
(R., p.388.)
While that new case was pending, the State also filed a report alleging a
probation violation, which was based on Mr. Gleese's admission that he had used
methamphetamine. (R., p.423.) That report indicated that Mr. Gleese had been doing
well on his probation, showed improvement in most regards, and had been moved to
low supervision. (R., p.408.) For example, his probation officer noted as follows:
[Mr. Gleese] had been in compliance with his probation since 8/20/10 and
was at a low level of supervision. He was living with his mother and once
employed, was working with his brother. He had shown maturity and good
decision making to that point. He is one of very few offenders I have ever
seen actually obtain their driver's license, save money and obtain an auto
loan before searching for a vehicle to purchase.

4

(R., p.408.) In fact, his probation officer had been considering moving Mr. Gleese to

unsupervised probation once he had finished paying his court costs and restitution.
(R., p.408.) She noted that the relapse was the result of a relationship which developed

between Mr. Gleese and a female probationer from which he could not extract himself.
(R., pp.423-24.) As a result, her report recommended Mr. Gleese be sent to another

rider program so that he could participate in programs to learn to deal with such
situations. (R., pp.409, 424.)
As a result of the new report of probation violation, Mr. Gleese's plea agreement
was amended to include his admission to the probation violations. (See Tr., p.5, Ls.1219.) The district court ordered a new PSI report, which recognized that Mr. Gleese has
a continuing need for treatment, and that he is amenable to such treatment.
p.107.)

(PSI,

However, because of his history and inability to fully succeed on probation,

it recommended that the district court execute his sentences. (PSI, pp.113-14.) The
district court, focusing on Mr. Gleese's criminal history, indicated that he has "not been
rehabilitated." (Tr., p.21, Ls.14-15.) As a result, it revoked his probation in the 2004
and 2005 cases (R., pp.438, 441,444), and imposed a new, concurrent sentence of five
years, with two years fixed, in the 2011 case.

(R., p.436.)

participation in the therapeutic program while incarcerated.

It did recommend his
(Tr., p.22, Ls.1-10.)

Mr. Gleese filed timely notices of appeal from those orders. (R., pp.459-70.)
On appeal, Mr. Gleese moved the Supreme Court to augment the appellate
record with the transcripts from the January 22, 2010, admit/deny hearing, the
March 11, 2010, disposition hearing, and the August 20, 2010, rider review hearing.
(Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and statement in Support

5

Thereof, filed April 29, 2013.) The Idaho Supreme Court denied that motion. (Order
Denying Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, filed May 22, 2013.)

6

ISSUES
1.

Whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Gleese due process and equal
protection when it denied his motion to augment the record with transcripts
necessary for review of the issues on appeal.

2.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by executing all of Mr. Gleese's
sentences without sufficiently considering the mitigating factors in his cases, or
alternatively, by failing to reduce the sentences when it revoked probation.

7

ARGUMENT
I.
Whether The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Gleese Due Process And Equal
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With Transcripts
Necessary For Review Of The Issues On Appeal

A.

Introduction
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, according to the

United States Supreme Court, assures indigent defendants that they will not be denied
access to transcripts which are relevant to issues they intend to raise on appeal. So
long as the record reflects a colorable need for such a transcript, the courts may not
refuse to provide that transcript unless the State proves that the transcript is not
relevant to an issue raised on appeal.
Mr. Gleese has raised a challenge to the decision to execute his sentences, or,
alternatively, to not reduce his sentences in the 2004 and 2005 cases sua sponte when
it did so. To present those claims, he requested that various transcripts be made part of
the appellate record. The Idaho Supreme Court denied the request for the transcripts
the January 22, 2010, admit/deny hearing, the March 11, 2010, disposition hearing, and
the August 20, 2010, rider review hearing.
As such, Mr. Gleese is also challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his
request for these transcripts on appeal.

Mr. Gleese asserts that the requested

transcripts are relevant to the challenge of the district court's decisions when it revoked
his probation and executed his sentence because the applicable standard of review
requires an appellate court to conduct an independent review of the entirety of the
proceedings in order to properly evaluate the district court's decisions.

8

B.

By Failing To Provide Mr. Gleese With Access To The Requested Transcripts,
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Gleese Due Process And Equal Protection
Because He Cannot Obtain An Effective Appellate Review Of His Claims
The United States Constitution, as well as the Constitution of the State of Idaho

guarantees criminal defendants due process and equal protection under the law.
U.S. CONST. amend XIV; IDAHO CONST. art I,§ 13. Due process requires the defendant
be given notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 333 (1976); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 445 (1991), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88 (1998). Essentially, due process requires that
judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of Durham
City, 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981); Card, 121 Idaho at 445. Those same standards have
been applied to article I, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Maresh v. State, Dep't of
Health & Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 227 (1998).
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to an appeal is created by statute.

See

I.C. § 19-2801. If an indigent defendant requests a relevant transcript, such transcript
must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); I.C. § 19-863(a); I.C.R. 5.2(a);
I.C.R. 54.7(a). A judgment of conviction imposing a new sentence is appealable as a
matter of right. I.AR. 11(c)(1). Similarly, an order revoking probation is made after the
judgment of conviction and affects the defendant's substantial rights. State v. Dryden,
105 Idaho 848, 852 (Ct. App. 1983). As such, it may be appealed as a matter of right.
I.AR. 11 (c)(9); State v. Thomas, 146 Idaho 592, 594 (2008).
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the question of whether
transcripts must be provided when such a right is established.
established two fundamental themes.

Its decisions have

First, the scope of the due process and equal

protection clauses is broad. Second, disparate treatment of indigent defendants is not
9

tolerable. As a result, the State must provide an adequate record for appellate review,
but that record need not include frivolous or unnecessary materials.
The seminal opinion from the United States Supreme Court is Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956).

In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial

court asking that a certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript
of the proceedings, be furnished [to] them without cost." Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13. At that
time, the State of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been
sentenced to death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase
transcripts themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme
Court was whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death-penalty
defendants was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16.
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich,
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem .... Both equal protection and due
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of
justice in every American court."'

Id. at 16-17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309

U.S. 227, 241 (1940)). As such, "[i]n criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on
account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color." Id. Furthermore:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal
10

Protection Clauses
discriminations.

protect

persons

Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted).

like

petitions

from

invidious

In order to satisfy the constitutional

mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be
provided with a record which facilitates an effective, merits-related appellate review.
At the same time, the United States Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript
is not necessary in instances where a less expensive, but no less adequate, alternative
exists. Id. at 20.
The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Griffin when it struck
down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court be accompanied with a
requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency.

See Bums v. Ohio, 360

U.S. 252 (1959). The Court held:
[O]nce the State chooses to establish appellate review in criminal cases, it
may not foreclose indigents from access to any phase of that procedure
because of their poverty. This principle is no less applicable where the
State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase of its
appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second
phase of that procedure solely because of his indigency.
Id. at 257. To permit otherwise, according to the Court, would result in an impermissible

destruction of the defendant's ability to pursue the right afforded him by the State. Id. at
258.
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court addressed how courts should
go about determining whether defendants are entitled to certain transcripts.

See

Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963). The Court clarified its statement in Griffin

- that a stenographic transcript is not necessary if an equivalent alternative is available.
Id. at 495.

"[P]art or all of the stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be

germane to consideration of the appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its

11

funds unnecessarily in such circumstances." Id.

The Court went on to discuss the

specific issues raised for appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the
requested transcripts, and it ultimately concluded that the issues raised by those
defendant could not be adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic
transcripts of the trial proceedings. Id. at 497-99.
The United States Supreme Court continued to expand the protections identified
in Griffin, applying them to non-felony offenses.
U.S. 189 (1971).

See Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404

Additionally, it placed the burden on the State to prove that the

requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on appeal. Id. at
195. In doing so, the Court held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument
that he or she needs the requested items to create a complete record on appeal. Id.
If a review of the appellate record establishes a need for the requested transcripts, it
becomes the State's burden to prove that the requested transcripts are not necessary
for the appeal. Id.
Both the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals have recognized
and applied the United States Supreme Court's precedent in this regard.

See, e.g.,

Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App.

2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App. 2007). As such, if the record reflects
that the transcripts are relevant to the issues on appeal and the State has not proved
that they are unnecessary for appellate review thereof, due process and equal
protection mandate that those transcripts be created and augmented to the record.

12

C.

The Transcripts Requested By Mr. Gleese Are Relevant To The Issues He Has
Raised On Appeal Because The Appellate Courts Independently Review The
Entire Record Before The District Court When Reviewing Decisions To Revoke
Probation And Execute The Underlying Sentence Without Reduction
The requested transcripts are necessary to review Mr. Gleese's claim that the

district court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation, or, alternatively, failed
to reduce his sentence sua sponte when it did so. "When we review a sentence that is
ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire record
encompassing events before and after the original judgment. We base our review upon
the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between
the original sentencing and the revocation of probation." State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho
26, 28 (Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis added). In other words, an appellate court reviewing
a district court's determinations regarding a defendant's sentence conducts an
independent review of the entire record to determine if the record supports those
decisions. Id. This standard of review is necessary in Idaho because judges are not
required to state their sentencing rationale on the record. See State v. Nield, 106 Idaho
665, 666 (1984).
The Idaho Court of Appeals recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan, 153
Idaho 618 (Ct. App. 2012), which addressed the scope of review of an order revoking a
defendant's probation. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty and was placed on
probation. Id. at 619. After a period of probation, the defendant admitted to violating
the terms of his probation and the district court revoked his probation, although it
retained jurisdiction. Id. at 619-20. After the defendant completed his rider, the district
court placed the defendant back on probation. Id. at 620. The defendant subsequently
admitted to violating the terms of his probation and the district court revoked that
probation. Id. The defendant appealed from the second order revoking probation. Id.
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On appeal, the defendant in Morgan filed a motion to augment the appellate
record with transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, which
was denied by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The defendant then challenged those
decisions on appeal, asserting they deprived him of due process and equal protection.
Id. at 620-21. The Idaho Court of Appeals held that the transcripts of the prior probation

proceedings were not necessary of the appeal because "they were not before the
district court in the second probation violation proceedings, and the district court gave
no indication that it based its revocation decision upon anything that occurred during
those proceedings."5

Id. at 621.

The Court of Appeals then clarified the scope of

review for a revocation determination:

In Morgan, the Court of Appeals refused to address the defendant's claim that the
Idaho Supreme Court had denied him due process on the basis that it does not have
the power to overrule a decision by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. at 621. However, the
Morgan Court went on to state that it would have the authority to review a renewed
motion to augment, which contained information or argument not presented to the Idaho
Supreme Court, if it was filed with the Court of Appeals after the case was assigned
to it. Id.; see also State v. Cornelison, _
P.3d _ , 2013 Opinion No.22, pp.3-4
(Ct. App. April 11, 2013) (not yet final); State v. Thompson, 2013 Unpublished Opinion
No.439, p.3 (Ct. App. April 9, 2013) (not yet final). This position is untenable because
the Idaho Appellate Rules require all motions to be filed directly with the Idaho Supreme
Court and expressly prohibit separate filings in the Court of Appeals:
5

All motions, petitions, briefs and other appellate documents, other than the
initial notice of appeal, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court
as required by the Idaho Appellate Rules with the court heading of the
Supreme Court of the State of Idaho as provided by Rule 6. There shall
be no separate filings directed to or filed with the Court of Appeals. In the
event of an assignment to the Court of Appeals, the title of the proceeding
and the identifying number thereof shall not be changed except that the
Clerk of the Supreme Court may add additional letters or other notations
to the case number so as to identify the assignment of the case. All case
filed shall be maintained in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court.

I.AR. 110 (emphasis added). Furthermore, I.AR. 30 requires all motions to augment
be filed with the Supreme Court:
14

[l]n reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that a//
proceedings in the trial court up to an including sentencing are germane.
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues
which are properly made part of the record on appeal.
Id. (emphasis in original).

However, whether or not the transcripts of the requested proceedings were
before the district court at the time of the probation revocation hearing is irrelevant in
regard to whether the transcripts are relevant to the issues on appeal. In reaching a
decision regarding the defendant's sentence, a district court is not limited to considering
only that information offered at the hearing from which the appeal is filed.

Rather, a

court is entitled to utilize knowledge gained from its own official position and
observations. See Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); see also

Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment or delete from the
settled reporter's transcript or clerk's or agency's record.

Unless otherwise expressly ordered by the Supreme Court such motion
shall be determined without oral argument. The reporter's transcript and
clerk's or agency's record may also be augmented or portions deleted by
stipulation of the parties and order of the Supreme Court.

I.AR. 30 (emphasis added). Mr. Gleese is not aware of any court rule which allows a
party to file a motion directly with the Court of Appeals. Since I.AR. 110 expressly
prohibits such filings, the Morgan Court's statement that the defendant could have filed
a renewed motion to augment directly with the Court of Appeals is contrary to the Idaho
Appellate Rules. Mr. Gleese recognizes that the facts in Morgan are similar to those in
his case, but, as articulated infra, he disagrees with that decision, which should be
overruled because it is directly contrary to the appellate rules.
Mr. Gleese is also aware that the Court of Appeals has recently rejected the
argument in regard to the applicability of the appellate rules. Cornelison, 2013 Opinion
No.22, pp.3-6. However, Cornelison is not yet final and Mr. Gleese also disagrees with
the holding in that case.
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State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) (recognizing that the findings of the trial judge

in sentencing are based, in part, upon what the district court heard during trial); State v.
Wallace, 98 Idaho 318, 321 (1977) (recognizing that the district court could rely upon

"the number of certain types of criminal transactions that [the judge] has observed in the
courts within his judicial district and the quantity of drugs therein involved"). In fact, the
Court of Appeals has held that such review is not only proper, but is actually expected
because "the judge hardly could be expected to disregard what he already knew about
[the defendant] from the other case." State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491, 495 (Ct. App.
1984). Thus, whether the prior hearings were transcribed at the time of the revocation
hearing leading to the appeal is irrelevant because the district court may rely upon the
information it already knows from presiding over the prior hearings when it made the
sentencing decision after revoking probation.
The reason that the appellate courts should look to the entire record when
reviewing the executed sentence has been explained by the Court of Appeals:
[W]hen we review a sentence ordered into execution after probation has
been revoked, we examine the entire record encompassing events before
and after the original judgment. We adopt this scope of review for two
reasons.
First, the district judge, when deciding whether to order
execution of the original sentence or of a reduced sentence, does not
artificially segregate the facts into prejudgment and postjudgment
categories. The judge naturally and quite properly remembers the entire
course of events and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision.
When reviewing that decision, we should consider the same facts.
Second, when a sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the
defendant has scant reason, and no incentive, to appeal. Only if the
probation is later revoked, and the sentence ordered into execution, does
the issue of an excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were
we to adopt the state's position that any claim of excessiveness is waived
if not made on immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but
suspending a sentence, defendants· would be forced to file preventive
appeals as a hedge against the risk that probation someday might be
revoked. We see no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do
we wish to see the appellate system cluttered with such cases.
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State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055-56 (Ct. App. 1989). As such, when an appellant

files an appeal from a sentence executed after the revocation of probation, the
applicable standard of review requires an independent and comprehensive inquiry into
the events which occurred prior to the probation revocation proceedings, as well as the
events which occurred during those proceedings.
The basis for this standard of review is that the district court "naturally and quite
properly remembers the entire course of events and considers all relevant facts in
reaching a decision." Id. It follows that "[w]hen reviewing that decision, [an appellate
court] should consider the same facts." Id. The Court of Appeals did not state that the
district court must expressly reference prior proceedings at the probation disposition
hearing in order for this standard to become applicable. To the contrary, the Court of
Appeals assumed the district court will automatically consider the prejudgment events
when determining what sentence should be executed after revoking probation.
Therefore, whether or not the prior hearings were transcribed is irrelevant, as an
appellate court will assume that the district court will remember the events from the prior
proceedings when it executes a sentence after revoking probation.
It is true, in this case, that two different district court judges presided over
hearings. The Honorable Charles W. Hosack presided over the initial hearings. When
he retired, Mr. Gleese's cases were reassigned to the Honorable Benjamin R. Simpson.
(See R., p.315.)

As a result, Mr. Gleese should at least have been afforded the

transcripts from the hearings over which Judge Simpson presided, since it is from one
of Judge Simpson's decisions that Mr. Gleese has appealed. See Downing, 136 Idaho
at 373-74; Adams, 115 Idaho at 1055-56; see also Sivak, 105 Idaho at 907; Wallace, 98
Idaho at 321; Gibson, 106 Idaho at 495.
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Since the requested transcripts are within the applicable standard of review, the
Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny Mr. Gleese access to those transcripts
constitutes a violation of his due process and equal protection rights. See, e.g., Mayer,
404 U.S. at 195; Callaghan, 143 Idaho at 859. For example, when a verbatim transcript
was necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the appellate court, the courts improperly
foreclosed access to the appellate process by denying indigent defendants access to
such transcripts.

Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 480-85 (1963).

The United States

Supreme Court made it clear that it is "constitutionally invalid ... to prevent an indigent
from taking an effective appeal." Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, in Idaho, an appellant
must provide an adequate record for review or face procedural default:

"It is well

established that an appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon
which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where
pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the
actions of the trial court."6 State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing

State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416, 422 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541

If transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes of those hearings, it is
possible the appellate courts might find that to be sufficient to conduct a meaningful
appellate review, and so the transcripts are not necessary for appellate review in such a
case. However, the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate
counsel not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that]
Court's review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999). Given that
holding, it is unlikely that the minutes will be sufficient to conduct a meaningful review,
and thus, a record containing only the minutes is unlikely to comport with the
constitutional requirements to provide due process and equal protection.
In this case, the minutes only contain summaries of the statements made, not the
full contents of their statements. The contents of those statements, particularly the
defendant's statements of allocution, are relevant to the excessive sentence claim.
See, e.g., State v. Gervasi, 138 Idaho 813, 816 (Ct. App. 2003). The missing
transcripts in this case would contain such statements. (See R., pp.323-26, 336-39,
351-53.) Therefore, the minutes, which do not provide the substance of these
statements, are insufficient in this case to provide for adequate review.
6
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(Ct. App. 1992); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991 ); State v. Murinko,
108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985)).

Therefore, if Mr. Gleese fails to provide the

appellate court with the transcripts necessary for review of his claim, this legal
presumption will apply and Mr. Gleese's claims regarding the excessiveness of his
sentence will not be addressed on their merits. In effect, that presumption (a result of
the Idaho Supreme Court not affording him access to relevant transcripts) would deprive
him of an effective appeal, making the appeal constitutionally invalid on due process
and equal protection grounds. See Lane, 372 U.S. at 480-85.
Alternatively, if it is state action alone which prevents the defendant from access
to the necessary items, because such action is a violation of equal protection and due
process, any such presumption should no longer apply. See, e.g., id. at 485. In that
situation, the foregoing presumption should be reversed in this case and what occurred
at those hearings should be presumed to discredit the district court's ultimate decision
to revoke probation.

When Mr. Gleese was first placed on probation and given the

opportunity for multiple periods of probation thereafter, the district court must have
found, at each subsequent hearing, that the circumstances were right to give
Mr. Gleese the opportunity to continue his rehabilitation as a member of society. See

State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998).

Therefore, by placing Mr. Gleese on

probation on each of those prior occasions, the district court must have determined that
the mitigating factors presented outweighed the aggravating factors presented.
I.C. § 19-2521; Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648.

See

As such, to presume that the missing

transcripts of those hearings supports the decision to revoke probation ignores the
mitigating factors that were present at those hearings and presents a negative, onesided view of Mr. Gleese. As a result, the denial of access to the requested transcripts
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has prevented Mr. Gleese from addressing those positive factors in support of his
appellate claims.

In light of that denial, Mr. Gleese argues that the events which

occurred at the subject hearings should, at least, be presumed to invalidate the district
court's final sentencing decisions in this matter.
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts necessary for
an effective, merits-based review on appeal. The requested transcripts are relevant to
the issues on appeal because the applicable standard of review for an appellate
sentencing claim requires the appellate court to conduct an independent review of all
the proceedings before the district court. Under this standard of review, the focus is not
on the district court's express sentencing rationale; to the contrary, the question on
appeal is if the record itself supports the district court's ultimate sentencing decision. As
such, the decision to deny Mr. Gleese's request for the necessary transcripts will render
his appeal ineffective and meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing
transcripts support the district court's sentencing decisions.

This functions as a

procedural bar to the appellate review of Mr. Gleese's sentencing claims on the merits
and, therefore, he should either be provided with the requested transcripts or the
presumption should not be applied. Since Mr. Gleese's request for those transcripts
was denied, that presumption means that the district court's sentencing decisions
should be reversed.
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By Failing To Provide Mr. Gleese With Access To The Requested Transcripts,
The Idaho Supreme Court Has Denied Him Due Process Because He Cannot
Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal

D.

The United States Supreme Court, relying on Griffin, supra, and its progeny,
determined that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also gives
defendants the right to counsel on appeal and requires effective representation:
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant
has a right to counsel at trial-would be a futile gesture unless it
comprehended the right to the effective assistance of counsel.

Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 397 (1985) (relying on Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353, 355-56 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45 (1963)).

As

such, the remaining issue is defining what constitutes effective assistance of counsel on
appeal.
According to the United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a
conscientious examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments
to be made.

See, e.g., Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).

The

constitutional requirements of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained
where counsel acts as an active advocate on behalf of his client. ... [Counsel's] role
as advocate requires that he support his client's appeal to the best of his ability. Id.;

see also Banuelos v. State, 127 Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this case, the lack
of access to the requested transcripts prevented appellate counsel from making a
conscientious examination of the case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel
from determining whether there is an additional issue to raise or whether there is factual
support in favor of, or cutting against, any argument made. Therefore, Mr. Gleese has
not obtained appellate review of the court proceedings based on the merits of his claims
and likely was not provided with effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor.
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Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that the starting point for
evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance in a criminal action is the
American Bar Association's Standards For Criminal Justice, The Defense Function.
State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989), overruled on other grounds by Card,
121 Idaho 425.

These standards offer insight into the role and responsibilities of

appellate counsel. Specifically, those standards state:
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . . . Counsel
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance.
Standard 4-8.3(b).

In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate

counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's
decision to revoke probation, which is now at issue.

Further, counsel is unable to

advise Mr. Gleese on the probable role the transcripts may play in his appeal.
Mr. Gleese is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant
transcripts.

Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Gleese his

constitutional rights to due process and equal protection which include the right to
effective assistance of counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be
provided with access to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity
to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of
that review.
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11.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Executing All Of Mr. Gleese's Sentences
Without Sufficiently Considering The Mitigating Factors In His Cases, Or Alternatively,
By Failing To Reduce The Sentences When It Revoked Probation
A.

Introduction
Mr. Gleese contends that the district court abused its discretion when it decided

to execute the sentences in his case, rather than place him on probation or retain
jurisdiction. The district court focused on his criminal history, but did not sufficiently
consider the mitigating factors in this case, most notably, the report that Mr. Gleese had
been doing well during his most recent period of probation, improving himself in most
respects. The district court also needed to sufficiently consider the information in that
report which noted that all Mr. Gleese needed was targeted programming to address a
specific type of situation that he had not been prepared to deal with. The evidence of
continued growth and improvement from Mr. Gleese's first period of retained jurisdiction
onward shows that incarceration was inappropriate in this case at this time under the
recognized sentencing objectives. As such, the district court's decision to execute all
the sentences, or at least, to not reduce the sentences from the 2004 and 2005 cases
when it did so, constitutes an abuse of discretion.

B.

The District Court Needed To Sufficiently Consider The Mitigating Factors In This
Case
In regard to the 2011 case, Mr. Gleese contends that his sentence is excessive,

in that the district court executed that sentence rather than place Mr. Gleese on
probation or retain jurisdiction. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court
imposed an excessively harsh sentence the appellate court will conduct an independent
review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of
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the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho
771, 772 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence."'

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Gleese does not allege that
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.

Accordingly, in order to show an abuse

of discretion, he must show that, in light of the governing criteria, the sentence is
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria, or sentencing
objectives, are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing.

Id.

The protection of society is the primary objective the court should

consider. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993). Therefore, a sentence that
protects society and also accomplishes the other objectives will be considered
reasonable. Id.; State v. Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). This is because
the protection of society is influenced by each of the other objectives, and as a result,
each must be addressed in sentencing. Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500; I.C. § 19-2521.
There are several factors that the appellate court should consider to determine
whether the objectives are served by a particular sentence.
Idaho 318, 320 (2006).

They include, but are not limited to:

State v. Knighton, 143

"the defendant's good

character, status as a first-time offentler, sincere expressions of remorse and
amenability to treatment, and support of family." Id. Insufficient consideration of these
factors has been the basis for a more lenient sentence in several cases. See, e.g.,
Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204,
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209 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on
other grounds, 117 Idaho 295, 301 (1990); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595
(1982).

In this case, several of those factors are present, but were insufficiently

considered by the district court as it crafted Mr. Gleese's sentence, and, as a result, the
sentence does not serve the objectives, and is excessive.
Additionally, Mr. Gleese asserts that, given any view of the facts, the decision to
revoke probation and execute his sentences in the 2004 and 2005 cases was an abuse
of the district court's discretion.

As with the imposition of sentence, the decision to

revoke probation is one within the district court's discretion. State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho
308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000). The district court must determine "whether the probation is
achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether continuation of the probation is
consistent with the protection of society."

Id.

The Legislature has established the

criteria for determining whether probation or incarceration is merited. State v. Merwin,
131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998) (citing I.C. § 19-2521). In reviewing such a decision, the
Court of Appeals uses a multi-tiered inquiry, determining "(1) whether the lower court
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted
within the boundaries of such discretion and consistent with any legal standards
applicable to the specific choice before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its
decision by an exercise of reason." Id. at 312-13 (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho
598, 600 (1989).
In this case, several of those factors are present, but were insufficiently
considered by the district court as it crafted its disposition in regard to Mr. Gleese. As a
result, it did not sufficiently consider whether Mr. Gleese's probation was adequately
serving the goal of rehabilitation or whether society required protection from Mr. Gleese
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through incarceration.

See Chavez, 134 Idaho at 312.

Therefore, this disposition

constitutes an abuse of discretion.
One of the issues that has underlain these cases is Mr. Gleese's educational
needs. Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires that a trial court consider the mental condition of
a defendant at sentencing.

Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999).

From the

beginning, it has been clear that Mr. Gleese has struggled in his programming because
of difficulties reading and speaking the English language. (PSI, p.4.) He has always
struggled in this regard, participating in special education classes and repeating the
second grade. (PSI, p.4.) In fact, the impact of this condition resulted in his first period
of retained jurisdiction being less than expected in terms of programming received.
(PSI, p.43; R., p.339.) That factor needed to be taken into consideration by the district
court when it considered whether probation or a rider would adequately serve the
sentencing objectives. See Hollon, 132 Idaho at 581.
In fact, the record indicates substantial growth by Mr. Gleese in this regard
throughout these cases, which means the periods of probation and retained jurisdiction
were doing exactly what they were supposed to do:

rehabilitating Mr. Gleese.

Therefore, the decision to give up on those programs in the face of their success
constitutes an abuse of discretion.

See Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500 (promoting

rehabilitation is one of the objectives to be considered in sentencing determinations).
During his first period of retained jurisdiction, Mr. Gleese dedicated substantial time to
working toward his GED, and the staff noted that, even accounting for his struggles with
literacy, he was still expected to be able to complete that program. (PSI, p.46.) In fact,
his improvement was so substantial that the next time he was sent to the rider facility,
he was assigned to complete the normal course of programs. (See PSI, p.87; compare,
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PSI, pp.43, 45-46.) And, while he struggled at times with those programs, he was able
to take the initiative, seek assistance from his classmates, and get himself caught back
up.

(PSI, p.89.) The program instructor noted "I have seen a significant change in

Mr. Gleese's attitude and self-confidence level."

(PSI, p.89.)

Based on such

developments during the program, Mr. Gleese earned a second recommendation for
probation. (See, e.g., PSI, p.89.)
His growth did not end there. For over a year, Mr. Gleese was able to comply
with probation. (See R., pp.407-08 (indicating that Mr. Gleese was in compliance with
the terms of his probation from August 20, 2010, through, approximately, December 26,
2011).)

In fact, he had earned the right to be subject to a low level of supervision

and "he was being considered for unsupervised probation as soon as he paid his
court ordered financial obligations."

(R., p.408.)

His probation officer was very

complimentary of his performance during that time: "He was living with his mother and
once employed, was working with his brother.7

He had shown maturity and good

decision making to that point. He is one of very few offenders I have ever seen actually
obtain their driver's license, save money and obtain an auto loan before searching for a
vehicle to purchase." (R., p.408.) As a result of his improvement, even considering his
past history, Mr. Gleese's probation officer recommended the district court continue to

Family constitutes an important part of a support network, which can help in
rehabilitation. See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 817 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding that
familial support offered to affirm the defendant's innocence does not equate to familial
support offered in consideration of rehabilitation, implying that had the support been
offered for rehabilitation, it would be a mitigating factor worthy of consideration). As his
father indicated to the district court, Mr. Gleese does have a significant support network.
(See R., p.338.) Therefore, this factor indicates Mr. Gleese is more likely to continue to
succeed on probation.
7
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try to rehabilitate Mr. Gleese rather than simply send him to prison. His probation officer
clarified that recommendation in an addendum to her report, noting:
[Mr. Gleese] became involved with a female probationer and has not been
able to separate himself from her. I believe his relationship with her is at
the root of his initial relapse and new crimes .... [he] would also benefit
from cognitive restructuring to help him deal with relationship issues and
boundary setting. As previously noted, Mr. Gleese had been doing well on
his probation and now it appears his downfall can be, in part, attributed to
the relationship he developed with the female probationer.
(R., pp.423-24.)

This evidence speaks highly of Mr. Gleese's continued ability to

rehabilitate and to become a productive member of society.
By not sufficiently considering this growth in its sentencing determination, but
instead focusing only on Mr. Gleese's criminal history, the district court failed to
recognize or consider one of the four objectives in sentencing: rehabilitation. To that
end, the Idaho Supreme Court has realized that timing is an important consideration
when addressing rehabilitation.

See State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953),

overruled on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 (1971); State v.
Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). The Court of Appeals has also continued to recognize
that timely and effective rehabilitation justifies lesser prison sentences.
Idaho at 489; State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1988).

Cook, 145
Timing is an

important consideration in this case, as Mr. Gleese was only twenty-six years old at the
most recent sentencing. 8 (See PSI, p.97.) As such, the time to invest in rehabilitative

Studies indicate that a young person's character continues to develop into early
adulthood. See, e.g., Brief for the American Psychological Association, et al. as Amici
Curiae in Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010), 2009 WL 2236778, at 12. For
example, a young person's ability to consider future consequences of an action
continues to develop into the early 20s. Id. (referencing Jari-Erik Nurmi, How Do
Adolescents See Their Future? A Review of the Development of Future Orientation and
Planning, 11 Developmental Rev. 1, 28-29 (1991 ); Laurence Steinberg et al., Age
Differences in Future Orientation and Delay Discounting, 80 Child Dev. 28, 30, 35-36
(2009).) As such, when a defendant is of an age similar to Mr. Gleese's, his age is a
8
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programming is now, as Mr. Gleese is not only more likely to be receptive to such
programming, but has actually demonstrated continued amenability to such treatment
and shows good potential to continue improving in the future. And since sentences are
to be crafted so that they do not force the prison system to continue detaining a person
once rehabilitation or age has decreased the risk of recidivism, Cook, 145 Idaho at 489;
Eubank, 114 Idaho at 639, incarcerating Mr. Gleese when age and rehabilitation are

reducing that risk means that this sentence constitutes an abuse of discretion.
A sufficient examination of all these factors reveals that a suspended sentence,
taking Mr. Gleese's rehabilitative efforts and potential into sufficient consideration, still
addresses all the other objectives - protection of society, punishment, and deterrence.
See State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 713 (1993) (requiring that alternative sentences

still address all the sentencing objectives).

When a sentencing court suspends a

sentence and orders probation, it still imposes a sentence.

Therefore, both the

retributive and the deterrent effects of the imposed sentence are still present.

See

State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 14-15 (Ct. App. 2008) (discussing how a sentence for a

period of probation addresses all the sentencing objectives and how the court's
continuing jurisdiction affects those objectives).
In addition to restricting Mr. Gleese's liberty at the discretion of the Board of
Correction and the looming sentence, a suspended sentence would also deprive him of
several of his rights (such as the right to possess a firearm), since this is a felony
offense. Furthermore, the district court would retain the ability to revoke probation and

factor which weighs in mitigation because it speaks significantly to this rehabilitative
potential. Cook, 145 Idaho at 489; Eubank, 114 Idaho at 639; Shideler, 103 Idaho at
395. A younger offender should be treated more leniently because he is still maturing,
and still able to become a productive member of society. See, e.g., State v. Dunnagan,
101 Idaho 125, 126 (1980).
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execute the original sentence if Mr. Gleese were to fail to adhere to the terms of his
probation. However, it could do so knowing that all the sentencing objectives properly
addressed. What the probationary period would provide that a term sentence would not
is the opportunity to rehabilitate in a real-world setting, allowing Mr. Gleese to apply the
lessons he would gain in out-patient treatment in a practical setting.
Alternatively, the district court would not lose anything in terms of protection of
society, deterrence, or punishment by retaining jurisdiction.

Society would have

received equally similar protection by retaining jurisdiction as it would by incarcerating
him. Mr. Gleese would be in the custody of the Department of Correction either way.
He could not harm society during that period, so society would be protected whether he
was on a rider or in prison. Furthermore, the district court would retain the ability to
relinquish jurisdiction and leave Mr. Gleese incarcerated for the entire fixed term of the
sentence if he does not show progress. And if the district court did that, the parole
board would have broad discretion over whether to release him on parole during the
indeterminate term of his sentence.

See, e.g., State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 931

(2005). However, the district court could relinquish jurisdiction and enforce the prison
sentence knowing that all the sentencing objectives were properly addressed. What the
rider would provide that a term sentence does not is the opportunity to rehabilitate, and
as the Supreme Court has noted, rehabilitation is more likely now than in the future.

See Owen, 73 Idaho at 402.
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C.

Alternatively, The District Court Should Have Reduced The Sentences In The
2004 And 2005 Cases When It Revoked Mr. Gleese's Probation In Those Cases
Even if the district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Mr. Gleese's

probation in the 2004 and 2005 cases, it did abuse its discretion by not further reducing
Mr. Gleese's sentences pursuant to Rule 35 when it did so. If the district court decides
to resume the execution of the underlying sentence by revoking probation, it also has
the authority to reduce the sentence, sua sponte, pursuant to Rule 35.

State v.

Timbana, 145 Idaho 779, 782 (2008).

The decision to not reduce a previously-pronounced sentence will be reversed on
appeal if it constitutes an abuse of the district court's discretion. State v. Hanington,
148 Idaho 26, 27 (Ct. App. 2009). The standard of review and factors considered in
such a decision are the same as those used for the initial sentencing. Id.; see Toohi/1,
103 Idaho at 568 (identifying the factors to be considered at sentencing). Therefore, the
district court needed to sufficiently consider the recognized sentencing objectives in light
of the mitigating factors in the record. See id.; Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. A failure
to do so should result in a more lenient sentence.

See, e.g., Cook, 145 Idaho at

489-90; Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595.
Therefore, for all the reasons articulated in Section ll(B), supra, as well as in
recognition of Mr. Gleese's otherwise successful participation on probation. Even if this
Court decides the decision to execute Mr. Gleese's sentences was not erroneous, it
should, at least, reduce them as it deems appropriate in recognition of Mr. Gleese's
growth throughout this process.
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CONCLUSION
Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which
arise as a result of that review.
respectfully

requests

this

In the event this request is denied, Mr. Gleese

Court vacate the

orders

executing

his sentences.

Alternatively, he requests this Court reduce his sentences as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 29th day of May, 2013.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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